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Abstract. Microcontrollers storing valuable data or using security func-
tions are vulnerable to fault injection attacks. Among the various types
of faults, instruction skips induced at runtime proved to be effective
against identification routines or encryption algorithms. Several research
works assessed a fault model that consists in a single instruction skip,
i.e. the ability to prevent one chosen instruction in a program from be-
ing executed. This assessment is used to design countermeasures able
to withstand a single instruction skip. We question this fault model on
experimental basis and report the possibility to induce with a laser an ar-
bitrary number of instruction skips. This ability to erase entire sections
of a firmware has strong implications regarding the design of counter-
measures.
1 Introduction
Fault attacks (fa) consist in disturbing the operations of a target integrated cir-
cuit (ic) for the purpose of extracting secret information it may contain. Faults,
or computation errors, are injected by means of altering the target environmen-
tal conditions [2] (e.g. its voltage, temperature, frequency, etc.). The induced
information leakage generally aims at extracting a cryptographic key [4] or at
providing an unauthorized access to some of the target functionalities [9].
Laser illumination may also be used to inject faults into an ic [7,16]. Laser is
probably the most expensive fault injection means, however it makes it possible
to inject faults with high accuracy even at advanced technology nodes [10]. It is
accurate both in terms of timing (faults may be injected with laser pulses as short
as a few picoseconds [12]) and in terms of location (it affects mainly the logic gate
located within its spot size that may be as low as a few micrometers [7]). This
explains why significant research work is dedicated to the study of laser-induced
fas.
The properties of the faults induced by laser (or by any other fault injection
means) are referred to as a fault model (fm). It is often linked to a given attack
scheme and expressed as an ability to meet requirements in terms of synchro-
nization with the target activity and extension of the induced fault (e.g. the fm
of the well-known Piret fa [14] requires to fault one byte of the aes algorithm
calculations before its last MixColumn transformation).
In this work, we report our analysis of the laser-induced instruction skip fm.
This fm relates to how a given instruction of a microcontroller program may be
skipped (i.e. not executed) at runtime. Several works already described this fm
and assessed the possibility of laser-induced single instruction skips [5,6,17]. The
assessment of fms on experimental grounds is of high interest regarding how fas
countermeasures (cms) are designed and tailored. As a matter of example, the
authors of [13] discussed two cms based on instruction redundancy designed on
the assumption that an attacker is only able to induce single instruction skips.
Would this assumption be proved wrong, their cms would be vulnerable.
Our experiments extend further this fm by reporting the feasibility of induc-
ing several successive instruction skips by laser illumination. It also assesses the
ability to skip several, but close, separate groups of instructions. This is a very
strong fm which is very difficult to defend against with software only cms.
This article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the state-of-the-art of
instruction skips and introduces the aim of our work. Our experimental setup
and settings are described in section 3. Section 4 reports the obtained results.
Then, the assessed fm is discussed in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 The laser-induced instruction skip fault model
2.1 Fault model definition
A fm generally describes the main properties of a fa scheme, often expressed in
terms of requirements of synchronization (requirement to fault a particular step
of an algorithm or program) and of extension (requirement to limit the fault
extension, e.g. to a single bit or a single byte). In this work, we consider the fm
related to laser fault injection. It may be defined at different levels of abstraction
from transistor or gate level (as the authors of [10] did to describe laser-induced
bit-set and bit-reset faults) to the assembler or algorithm level. We studied the
fm of microcontrollers experiencing laser-induced instruction skips.
2.2 The instruction skip fault model, State-of-the-Art
An instruction skip is a fault that results in skipping, meaning not executing,
one instruction of a microcontroller program at runtime (as if the program flow
had skipped over the faulted instruction).
Several works studied the em-induced instruction skip fm. Most of them as-
sessed single instruction skips (in the same 8-bit microcontroller we used as target
for [3], and on a 32-bit microcontroller for [13]). To the best of our knowledge, the
only works reporting several successive instruction skips are [15] and [20]. [15] as-
sessed four successive skips of instructions stored in the target instruction cache
while [20] succeeded in faulting instructions stored in the target’s pipeline.
Several works also deal with laser-induced instruction skips. [5, 6] obtained
single instruction skips with high accuracy and high success rate (on the same
microcontroller we studied) and used it to perform a successful differential fault
attack on aes. Still on the same target, [11] reports instruction skips based
on resetting one or two bits of the targeted instruction opcode. The authors
of [17] induced instruction skips on a more complex 32-bit cortex-M3 microcon-
troller. They were able to inject two single instruction skips distant from 58 ms
to defeat a protected CRT-RSA algorithm. In terms of target complexity, [19]
reports injection of single instruction skips into a quad core ARM cortex A9
microprocessor running at 1.4 GHz clock frequency. Hence, the state-of-the-art
in laser-induced instruction skip was limited to single instruction skips (with a
repetition rate in the range of tens of ms).
2.3 Study of laser-induced instruction skips
There is to date very few explanations of how an instruction skip is induced
at the gate level, with the notable exception of [1]. It describes how increasing
progressively the stress applied by a clock glitch to a microcontroller induces
an increasing number of bit-reset faults into an instruction opcode. It results
in (1) instruction modification at low stress or (2) in turning the instruction
into an actual nop at high stress (i.e. the no operation instruction). Instruction
modification achieves an instruction skip if the modified instruction has no effect
on the code operations (instruction skips are often actual code modification); the
same is true for turning an instruction into a nop. An analysis of single instruction
skips due to instruction modification induced by laser is reported in [8]. It relates
how faulting one bit of an instruction opcode led to two successful fas.
Our research objective was to reproduce laser-induced instruction skips on
a microcontroller and to study the main characteristics of its fm: accuracy,
extent, success rate, time between successful skips, etc. Our aim was also to
assess whether the single instruction skip fault model could be extended further
to multiple instruction skips. This latter aim was of interest because cms are
based on the known fms. Hence, a cm based on a too narrow fm may reveal
vulnerabilities at test time. From previous experiments and taking into account
the results of [1, 5, 6], we focused our experiments toward achieving instruction
skips by turning the target instructions into nop instructions. Our experiments
were carried out with the same 8-bit microcontroller studied by [1,3,5,6,11] for
comparison purposes and also to ease the analysis of the obtained results.
3 Experimental settings
3.1 Laser bench
Laser source parameters Our laser source is a nanosecond range laser source
able to output a laser pulse with a 50 ns to 1 s tunable duration. It has a latency
of less than 300 ns (i.e. the time interval between the trigger signal and the
moment an actual laser pulse hits the target). Its wavelength is 1,064 nm (or
near infrared, nir). The use of a nir laser source allowed us to perform our laser
fault injection experiments through the target’s rear side because it is able to
Fig. 1. Schematic of the main components of the used ir laser source.
pass through several hundreds of micrometers of silicon without being totally
attenuated (the silicon die was also thinned down from 500µm to 300µm). The
laser source max power is 3 W (measured at the fiber optic output) which is
enough to inject faults into the target. We performed our experiments with a
×20 objective lens: it outputs a laser spot diameter of 5µm. An infrared camera
was used to adjust the laser spot focus and location w.r.t. the target’s layout.
Laser source technology Figure 1 provides a schematic view of the laser
source technology. Any outputted laser pulse is carved from a continuous laser
beam produced by a nir laser diode thanks to an electro-optical switch (the
laser diode operates on an ON/OFF basis). It takes 25 ns to open (resp. close)
the optical switch of our source and to output a laser pulse that reaches the
3 W nominal power (resp. to extinguish a laser pulse). This explains that the
shortest achievable laser pulse is 50 ns long. It also offers the ability to generate
several consecutive laser pulses with a pause time in between as short as 50 ns.
This repetition rate of 50 ns is a useful property for an attacker as underlined in
subsection 4.4. An electronic board drives the optical switch (denoted Electronic
cmd in Fig. 1). It features two laser shot modes, (1) the Trigger Mode and (2)
the GateIn Mode:
– in Trigger Mode, a single laser pulse is produced in response to a voltage
pulse delivered on the input bnc connector TrigIn (its duration, its power,
and its delay w.r.t. the trigger signal are programmable),
– in GateIn Mode, the optical switch openings and closings follow the shape
of the voltage signal applied on the input bnc connector GateIn. It makes it
possible to generate a succession of voltage pulses of arbitrary shape (only
constrained by the 25 ns open/close time of the switch).
A beam splitter captures a small amount of the laser pulse power that is con-
verted into a voltage by a photodiode (see Fig. 1). It may be observed on the
source PulseOut output bnc connector. This feature is useful to observe the
synchronization of the actual laser pulse with the target activity.
Fig. 2. Frontside view of the ATmega328P test chip - Flash, ram and eeprom mem-
ories highlighted in red.
Laser bench The target is placed on a XYZ stage (with 0.1µm accuracy). An
ir camera is used to observe the location of the laser spot. The activity of the
target and the laser source signals are recorded with an oscilloscope.
Laser-Sensitivity Map Drawing Process Using a control pc to automate
the process, we moved the laser over the area of the targeted device by dis-
placement steps from 50µm to 5µm. For each position, we shot the laser while
the microcontroller was running the test codes described in subsection 3.3. This
allowed us to draw XY maps of laser-sensitivity: for each position where a fault
was recorded, we drew a dot colored according to the obtained faults. Such
laser-sensitivity maps were drawn for various laser power and timing.
3.2 Test chip
We chose a simple target for the purpose of being able to analyse easily its
answers to fault injection: an 8-bit non-secure ATmega328P microcontroller de-
signed in the old cmos 0.35µm technology. It has 2 kB ram, 3 kB Flash and 1 kB
eeprom memories; a Harvard architecture with a 2-stage fetch-execute pipeline.
It runs at 16 MHz and has 32 general purpose registers. Registers r16 to r25 were
used during our experiments. Figure 2 gives a front view of the test chip with
its Flash, ram and eeprom memories highlighted in red. A red cross near the
device bonding pads on its left shows the XY origin we used as a reference.
3.3 Test codes
We studied the effect of laser-induced faults on dedicated test codes mostly
written in assembly langage. Our intent was to induce and analyze instruction
skips by examining their effect on the assembly instructions of the test codes.
For each test series, we used two trigger signals for synchronization purposes
(two outputs of the test chip):
Listing 1 Test code - Instruction skip analysis.
1 # Store 0x39 to 0x30 in RAM at address Z
2 # Initialize r16 to r25 at 0x55
3 # Set synchronization trigger
4 nop # 400 ns
5 # Set core trigger
6 ld r16,Z+ ld r16,Z+
7 ld r17,Z+ ld r17,Z+
8 ld r18,Z+ ld r18,Z+
9 ld r19,Z+ nop
10 ld r20,Z+ ld r20,Z+
11 ld r21,Z+ ld r21,Z+
12 ld r22,Z+ ld r22,Z+
13 ld r23,Z+ ld r23,Z+
14 ld r24,Z+ ld r24,Z+
15 ld r25,Z+ ld r25,Z+
16 # Clear core trigger
17 nop # 700 ns
18 # Clear synchronization trigger
19 # read back r16 to r25
– a synchronization trigger signal to accommodate for the latency of the laser
source,
– a core trigger signal to synchronize the actual laser shot (thanks to the
PulseOut signal) with the part of the assembly code of interest.
Listing 1 provides a description of the test code we used to tune our settings in
order to induce instruction skips. The core part of the test code (encompassed by
the core trigger) is a series of ten ld rX,Z+ instructions, each one corresponding
to a load in a destination register rX of a byte value stored in ram memory at
address Z with a post increment of Z. Prior to that, the ten destination registers,
r16 to r25, are initialized at 0x55 and an array of ten byte values 0x39 to 0x30
are stored in ram with Z storing the address of its first element. Registers r16
to r25 are read back after the synchronization trigger is reseted (the two top
blue signals in Figure 4 are the synchronization and core triggers drawn for a
fault free execution). The top part of Table 1 displays the values read back from
r16 to r25 for a fault-free execution
Table 1. Registers r16 to r25 readback values, for a fault free execution (top) and for
an instruction skip targeting r19 (bottom, highlighted in red).
Register 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25
Fault free 0x39 0x38 0x37 0x36 0x35 0x34 0x33 0x32 0x31 0x30
Faulted 0x39 0x38 0x37 0x55 0x36 0x35 0x34 0x33 0x32 0x31
As an example, the right column of the test code core part in Listing 1
displays the effect of a laser shot turning the ld instruction of line 9 into a nop
instruction. The effect of such a laser-induced instruction skip is highlighted in
the bottom part of Table 1: the initialization value 0x55 is read back from r19
(in red), and because an increment of address Z is missing, all the values read
back from r20 to r25 are shifted (in gray).
4 Experimental results
4.1 Finding the Points-of-Interest
General overview Our first series of experiments aimed at finding a point
where laser illumination of our target would induce an instruction skip in the
test code of Listing 1. Using the synchronization trigger, the delay was set to
target the ld operation into register r19. The laser pulse duration was set to
200 ns (a little more than three clock periods) and its power to 0.5 W. In order
to gain a first insight of potential points of interest (i.e. inducing instruction
skips), we scanned the whole target area with XY steps of 50µm. The obtained
results are depicted in Fig. 3(a), while the color and shape code describing the
faulty behavior is given in Fig. 3(c). The color denotes the number of registers
storing the initialization value at read back indicating that the corresponding ld
operations were not executed (from no register noted S0 to 10 registers noted
SA), the shape indicates the number of other incorrect values stored into the
registers at read back (from 0 noted E0 to 10 noted EA). As an example, the
instruction skip exemplified in the bottom part of table 1 is depicted by a black
× shape (r19 storing the initialization value and r20 to r25 storing six incorrect
values, i.e. S1E6).
We identified the following faulty behaviors:
– Red squares on top near an analog block, locations for which the registers
read back was all zero. We did not study further this faulty mechanism.
– Red barred squares near the bottom left corner of the Flash memory for
which communication with the test chip was lost (until reset).
– Horizontal patterns spanning along the width of the Flash memory (identi-
fied with letters from A to E) which were consistent with instruction skips
as explained in table 1.
Spatial focus on points of interest Our next experiments focused on the
left edge of the Flash memory with an increased spatial accuracy: XY step set
to 10µm. On its left, figure 3(b) reports the observed fault model for a register
initialization value of 0x55. The green color of patterns B to E revealed fault
models that are not consistent with an instruction skip (the initialization value
was not found in any of registers r16 to r25 at read back). We do not report
any further analysis of the corresponding fault models since this research work
focuses on instruction skips. Note that the authors of [11] obtained similar fault
patterns on the same microcontroller, which they identified as bit reset faults
induced at read back on the 16-bit opcode instructions.
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(a) General overview. (b) Flash left edge.
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(c) Faults color and shape keys.
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(d) Focus on pattern A.
Fig. 3. Laser sensitivity maps obtained while running Listing 1 test code: general
overview (a) and focused overviews (b, d); fault key (c).
Instruction skip sensitive area Fault pattern A reveals a different behavior
(see sensitivity map of Fig. 3(d)). Several consecutive instruction skips, from one
(depicted in black) to six (depicted in grey), were obtained. The corresponding
shapes also revealed that the skips where followed by shifts of the values stored
into the registers following the skipped registers. In addition, the right map in
figure 3(b) shows with red crosses the fault locations where the duration of the
trigger signals was shortened by one or more clock periods. It further reinforces
our analysis that the instruction skips in pattern A are obtained by turning the
ld instructions into nop instructions. Because execution of a ld instruction takes
two clock periods contrary to a nop instruction which takes one clock period, each
consecutive instruction skip shall correspond to a reduction of the test code of
one clock period. This phenomenon is displayed in figure 4 for a single instruction
skip. The test code execution time is shortened as well as the duration of the
triggers signals: the fault free execution triggers in blue last one clock period
more than the faulted execution that is drawn in red (the third signal, in red,
is the laser source PulseOut output which shows the actual timing of the laser
pulse). For each fault injection location of pattern A, we observed a shortening
of the trigger signals equals to the number of instruction skips multiplied by the
clock period.
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and blue resp.), and PulseOut laser source output signal.
4.2 Laser-induced instruction skip, test of accuracy
The left part of pattern A, lying outside the Flash memory, seemed more promis-
ing in terms of ability to induce instruction skips. We performed there a set of
experiments with an increased XY step accuracy of 5µm and laser settings rang-
ing from 0.2 W to 0.5 W (0.1 W step) and 50 ns to 125 ns duration (25 ns step).
Our objective was to find parameters allowing to induce single instruction skips
with high repeatability. We were indeed able to find several locations where we
induced such single instruction skips on r19 with a 100 % success rate (the laser
parameters were set to 75 ns pulse duration and 0.4 W power). These locations,
close to (950µm ; 1,350µm) (see map of Fig. 3(d)), were used for the experiments
reported hereafter.
In terms of accuracy, we also tested whether this single instruction skip fault
model was still valid while targeting the ld instruction of the other test registers.
Our aim was to assess an attacker ability to target arbitrarily a single instruction
of a program. To do so, we varied the time delay between the laser shot and the
synchronization trigger signal to span the whole test code. Figure 5(a) reports
the obtained results. It displays the skipped registers as a function of the delay.
It reveals that an attacker is able to inject laser-induced single instruction skips
into a running microcontroller with high timing accuracy. For each instruction,
we were able to find an injection timing leading to 100 % success rate (this success
rate may be lower than 100 % while passing from one instruction to the other).
At some timings, two consecutive instructions were skipped (e.g. at 1,390 ns or
1,625 ns in Fig. 5(a)), suggesting that several consecutive instructions may be
skipped simultaneously. For the purpose of verifying this suggestion, we again
carried out our experiments with a laser duration increased to 125 ns (two clock
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Fig. 5. Faulted registers as a function of laser injection time: laser power of 0.4 W and
duration of 75 ns (a) and 125 ns (b).
cycles) and a delay step set to 20 ns. The corresponding results are displayed in
figure 5(b). It shows that increasing the laser duration to 125 ns makes it possible
to skip two consecutive instructions with a still high timing accuracy (i.e. the
ability to choose the two skipped instructions).
4.3 Laser-induced arbitrary number of instruction skips
We also tested whether increasing the laser pulse duration would make it possible
to skip an arbitrary number of consecutive instructions. The laser power was kept
constant at 0.4 W, and the delay was set to target the ld instruction of register
r19. The test series were carried out for a pulse duration ranging from 50 ns to
410 ns with an increment step of 30 ns. Figure 6 reports the obtained results.
A first instruction skip was obtained for a laser pulse duration of 80 ns. Then,
the number of instruction skips increased progressively with the pulse duration
up to 7 consecutive skips at 350 ns. On average an additional instruction skip was
obtained for every 60 ns increment of the laser pulse duration. For each number
of instruction skips between 1 and 7, we were able to find settings leading to a
100 % success rate.
This suggested that a fault model for which an attacker has the ability to skip
an arbitrary number of code instructions (i.e. a chosen number) is feasible. We
used the test code shown in Listing 2 to ascertain the highest possible number
of consecutive skips. Its structure is similar to the code of listing 1: a set of
target assembly instructions marked by a core trigger encompassed by a larger
synchronization trigger with nop instructions in between. We chose the adiw,
or add immediate to word, instruction as target. The target part of the test
code had several successive adiw instructions used to increment by one the 16-
bit word stored in the r25:r24 registers pair. We chose it over other addition
instructions because it lasts two clock cycles, hence each adiw faulted into a
nop shall be ascertained both by the final value stored in r25:r24 and by a
shortening of the trigger signals.
For our experiments, r25:r24 was initialized at 0x0000 and the sequence
of adiw instructions set to 300. The laser power and delay were set to 0.5 W
and 800 ns. As we increased progressively the laser pulse duration, an increased
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Fig. 6. Faulted registers as a function of the laser pulse duration (laser duration from
50 ns to 410 ns, 0.4 W laser power).
Listing 2 Test code - Max. number of instruction skips.
1 # Initialize r25:r24 at 0x0000
2 # Set synchronization trigger
3 nop # 300 ns
4 # Set core trigger
5 adiw r24,0x01
6 ... # 300 times
7 adiw r24,0x01
8 # Clear core trigger
9 nop # 300 ns
10 # Clear synchronization trigger
11 # read back r25:r24
number of adiw instructions were skipped, for which the shortening of the trigger
signals was in accordance with the number of missing additions into r25:r24.
Table 2 gives the number of obtained successive instruction skips for a selection
of laser pulse durations. It took a 20,400 ns long laser pulse to skip the whole 300
adiw instructions. Note that the reproducibility of the experiments decreased a
bit as the laser pulse duration increased: the number of induced skips varied from
1 or 2 skips at 1,000 ns to 4-5 skips above 10,000 ns from one experiment to the
other. We did not test the number of skipped instructions beyond 300. There is
a maximal number of instruction skips set by the endurance to laser illumination
of the target circuit. Indeed, our device was destroyed when accidentally exposed
Table 2. Number of obtained instruction skips vs laser pulse duration
Laser pulse duration (ns) 1,000 2,000 5,000 10,000 20,400
Number of instr. skips 17 33 82 143 300
to a continuous laser pulse at the same 0.5 W power. However, the device we used
for these experiments showed no sign of fatigue after several tests at 20,400 ns
laser pulse duration.
4.4 PIN bypass with several laser pulses
The technology of our laser source (see description given in subsection 3.1) makes
it possible to carve several consecutive pulses in the continuous laser beam de-
livered by a laser diode. Using such a sequence of laser pulses an attacker might
be able to skip several sections of arbitrary length in the target’s firmware.
In order to assess the feasibility of this fault injection technique, we targeted
a 4-digit PIN verification algorithm (described in [9]). It is protected against
side channel timing analysis by a constant-time implementation: every of the
digits entered by the user are compared with those of a reference PIN. The
four corresponding comparison loops are shown in Listing 3, where i is the
index of the user and reference PIN arrays (resp. a1[i] and a2[i]), PINSIZE
the PIN code length, BOOL TRUE and BOOL FALSE are resp. the true and false
boolean values, and diff a variable indicating whether the user and reference
PINs differ or not. diff set to BOOL TRUE indicates that the user and reference
PINs are different: as a result the user identification will be rejected (this part
of the code is not shown). diff is initialized at BOOL FALSE before running the
PIN arrays compare loops.
Listing 3 C code of the PIN arrays compare loops.
1 BOOL diff = BOOL_FALSE;
2 ...
3 for(i = 0; i < PINSIZE; i++) {
4 if(a1[i] != a2[i]) {
5 diff = BOOL_TRUE;
6 }
7 }
Laser-induced fault injection may be used to force the identification of an
attacker using a wrong PIN. As illustrated in [8], where a laser-induced mod-
ification of one instruction of a similar PIN algorithm permits to perform a
PIN bypass. [9] describes, on simulation basis, several instruction skip attacks
that may result in a successful PIN bypass: most of them targeting one or a
few successive code instructions. We chose to implement that which consists in
skipping the four instructions in charge of setting diff to BOOL TRUE when a
false user PIN is used (line 5 of Listing 3). This fault model is often considered
as unlikely because the laser pulse repetition rate of laser sources may be too
long. However, our laser is able to meet the 875 ns duration of the PIN compare
loops (it is able to emit successive pulses in less than 50 ns). We were able to
synchronize four 60 ns long laser pulses in order to skip the instructions used to
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Fig. 7. Laser-induced PIN code bypass induced by four laser pulses emitted in a row
(4×60 ns, 0.5 W, 875 ns interval).
set diff to BOOL TRUE (with a 0.5 W laser power) and gain identification with
a false user PIN. Figure 7 displays the core trigger signal encompassing tightly
the comparison loops and the PulseOut signal showing the actual timing and
shape of the four laser pulses.
5 Discussion
5.1 Laser-induced instruction skip fault model
A powerful fault model This work, based on experimental results, studied
the instruction skip fm obtained on an 8-bit microcontroller exposed to laser
illumination. It demonstrates that a very high accuracy is achievable: we were
able to choose and skip a single instruction into a test sequence with a 100 %
success rate. Moreover, what gives a particular strength to this fm (and where
its novelty lie w.r.t. [15,20]) is the ability, by increasing the duration of the laser
pulse, to skip an arbitrary number of consecutive instructions of the target’s
firmware. Provided an attacker is able to find out the adequate laser settings,
he shall be able to erase an entire section of a program. Using a laser source
with low repetition rate (less than 50 ns in our case), we were also able to skip
instructions in the four comparison loops of a PIN code verification algorithm.
It made it possible to bypass the PIN verification. This further extends the fm’s
ability to skip (i.e. erase) several sections of arbitrary length of a microcontroller
firmware at runtime.
The strength of this fault model may questions the feasibility of software
cms (a question already raised by [20]): if an attacker has the ability to erase
arbitrary sections of a firmware, he will also skip the software cms it contains.
However, secure ics embed various types of cms (e.g. laser sensors, hardware
redundancy, etc.) that are not put at risk by this fm.
Denomination of the fault model The laser-induced instruction skip fm
relies on two possible mechanisms: (1) injecting faults into an instruction opcode
[8,11] that turn it into another instruction, or (2) replacing it by a nop instruction
(this work). In neither case is the instruction really skipped over. The faults
we obtained may rather be described as nop-ization or as instruction erasure.
However, we stuck with the instruction skip denomination for the purpose of
avoiding confusion; though, the underlying phenomenon is not an actual skip.
5.2 Synchronization
The fault model we explored is powerful both in terms of accuracy (the ability to
skip a single chosen instruction) and of extent (ability to skip several consecutive
instructions). However, we used a white box approach for which we used trigger
signals to synchronize the laser shots with the test codes. The lack of a trigger
signal shall be one of the main difficulty to be tackle with for a real attack case:
difficulty of synchronization constitutes a useful and effective counter-measure.
Though, the use of a smart trigger based on real-time pattern recognition of
a side channel signal (e.g. the power consumption of the target) may allow an
attacker to obtain an accurate synchronization with the operations of its target
(as in [18]). Then, the use of a first synchronization may be used to perform
a complex attack. As an example, consider the PIN bypass case described in
subsection 4.4. An attacker may reverse a PIN verification algorithm in a black
box scenario for which the PIN algorithm is unknown, provided he owns a valid
identification PIN in order to reinitialize periodically the number of PIN trials (it
is usually limited to three). This is a four steps process (considering a four digits
PIN code). The first step consists in synchronizing a first laser pulse with the
first compare loop (see Listing 3) by using a PIN code having a first false digit
and three other correct digits. The first synchronization step is achieved when
the PIN identification is obtained. Then, iteratively the same process may be
used one digit after the other to obtained a full synchronization of the attack. As
soon as, the time profile (and laser settings) of a successful PIN bypass is known
to the attacker, he will be able to reproduce the attack and gain illegitimate
access to whatever is protected by the same PIN verification algorithm.
5.3 Generalization
Our experiments were carried out on a non-secure AVR 8-bit microcontroller
which architecture was introduced in 1997. This raises the question of the gen-
eralization of the obtained fm to up-to-date microcontrollers. A firm answer to
this question is certainly to be based on actual experiments on other targets
(e.g. 32-bit microcontrollers).
However, several research works provide indications in favor of generalization.
[17] reports laser-induced single instruction skips obtained on a 32-bit cortex-
M3 target. The laser sensitive area they identified is located close to the Flash
memory of their target, in a similar way of our work. This suggest that a similar
mechanism may be at work, even though they did not test the feasibility of
successive instruction skips. The authors of [8] also induced single instruction
skips through laser illumination into a cortex-M3 microcontroller by faulting a
single bit of the targeted instruction (hence inducing an instruction modification
equivalent to an instruction skip because the modified instruction had no effect
on the executed test code). The physical mechanism they revealed as the root
cause of this instruction skip (a laser-induced discharge of a bitline of the Flash
memory) appears compatible with induction of several skips if a long laser pulse
is used. In terms of accuracy, [10] reports that single bit faults may be induced
by laser in targets designed in a technology as advanced as the 28 nm cmos
process. These different research works suggest that a fm for which a single or
several successive instruction skips may be feasible with careful tuning of a laser
shot parameters and should be considered when designing a secure circuit.
6 Conclusion
This research work assesses on experimental basis an extended fault model for
laser-induced instruction skips. The main characteristics of this fault model are:
– its accuracy, or ability to choose the skipped instruction with a 100 % success
rate provided a precise synchronization is obtained,
– its extension, or ability to skip an arbitrary number of successive instructions,
– its flexibility, or ability to skip several sections of the targeted firmware.
Simply put, laser fa may offer an attacker the ability to erase chosen parts of a
microcontroller firmware at runtime. Generalization of this fm beyond the case
of our 8-bit target is to be proven, though several results provides arguments in
favor of such a possibility. However, this first experimental assessment speaks in
favor of considering it when designing cms. A task that may prove difficult to
complete given the assumption that any part of a software cm might be skipped.
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